Torture and incommensurable traditions
With more and more coming out about the use of torture by the U.S. government and armed forces, the morality of this issue is making the rounds once again. The usual sides are positioning. There isn't much to add in the argument itself beyond what a number of bloggers, including Tom at Disputations, Mark Shea, Daniel Larison, Zippy, and others have pointed out. To me, this issue more than any other seems to clarify which moral tradition one belongs to. Now, apparently, Deal Hudson is entertaining joining those who put RNC loyalty before natural law and the teaching of the Church.
What occurred to me in reading Larison's recent thoughts on the matter was that the legitimization of torture under the Jack Ryan ethic is the dark side of the liberal tradition. I'm talking about MacIntyre and Three Rival Versions here. It's the desire for a rational ethics in the Kantian sense, a universally understood philosophy, advocating one universal rule of justice and right that preempts all disagreement. Peace and the cessation of all conflict--which was of course judged to be religious in origin--was the goal that the proponents of this tradition in its glory days expected. But when faced with the hard facts of reality, the only conclusion that can remain within that tradition is consequentialism--and that's pretty much what it has become (the only Kantians left are in movies and comic books). There's much that could be unpacked there, but that's not my point in calling this to attention.
My point is that the conservative defense of torture, which a surprising number (if not, majority?) of American Christians share, follows from the principles of the liberal (in the sense of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Kant) tradition of modernity. (Notably, as does free-market capitalism, which conservatives defend as fiercely as they do torture; which makes sense, as they presuppose the same view of the person and society). The Aristotelian-catholic tradition works from a wholly different set of principles. In other words: according to Alasdair MacIntyre, a debate or an attempt to argue for the truth of torture between these traditions is impossible, as the traditions are incommensurable. As Larison put it, they work within two wholly different (despite superficial appearances of similarity due to language) moral universes. All that can be done is for the Aristotelian-catholic tradition to try to point out the incoherence of the the rival tradition's set of principles. To me, it seems this is the task at hand.
What occurred to me in reading Larison's recent thoughts on the matter was that the legitimization of torture under the Jack Ryan ethic is the dark side of the liberal tradition. I'm talking about MacIntyre and Three Rival Versions here. It's the desire for a rational ethics in the Kantian sense, a universally understood philosophy, advocating one universal rule of justice and right that preempts all disagreement. Peace and the cessation of all conflict--which was of course judged to be religious in origin--was the goal that the proponents of this tradition in its glory days expected. But when faced with the hard facts of reality, the only conclusion that can remain within that tradition is consequentialism--and that's pretty much what it has become (the only Kantians left are in movies and comic books). There's much that could be unpacked there, but that's not my point in calling this to attention.
My point is that the conservative defense of torture, which a surprising number (if not, majority?) of American Christians share, follows from the principles of the liberal (in the sense of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Kant) tradition of modernity. (Notably, as does free-market capitalism, which conservatives defend as fiercely as they do torture; which makes sense, as they presuppose the same view of the person and society). The Aristotelian-catholic tradition works from a wholly different set of principles. In other words: according to Alasdair MacIntyre, a debate or an attempt to argue for the truth of torture between these traditions is impossible, as the traditions are incommensurable. As Larison put it, they work within two wholly different (despite superficial appearances of similarity due to language) moral universes. All that can be done is for the Aristotelian-catholic tradition to try to point out the incoherence of the the rival tradition's set of principles. To me, it seems this is the task at hand.
