7.24.2006

"Take a right at the light, keep goin' straight until night, and then, boy, you're on your own"


Tomorrow morning I leave for Dallas, to begin the new soujourn that may lead me somewhere past where I've been: between memory and hope.

It's been grand to blog here and there, but I expect I will have a little less time for a while as I adjust to a new place, a new hook, a new beat. Hopefully I will inspire an affection for Brit Lit in Juniors, and perhaps help lead the frosh football team to a winning season. In the meantime, those of you in the know, pray for my vocation and all that.

I'll try to post up periodically. We'll see what happens. 'Till then, as they say in the backwoods of Austria:

Pfirti!

7.20.2006

No longer one indivisible nation

It has become fashionable in intellectual circles to speak of several United States, like when we speak of the history of France, and the First Republic, Second Republic, etc. So according to this thesis, there are enough differences of kind (and not merely of degree) in observing the history of the United States to seperate the periods into different nations. An interesting thesis.

In A Canticle For Leibowitz in the post-atomic apocalyptic future, America has disintegrated into several smaller nations or even tribal-states (e.g. Somalia). Looking at that map in the post below of the votes in the recent senate bill, I was thinking, maybe we should also fashionably begin referring to the different parts of our nation as they reflect significantly different cultural ethoi, reflected in the Senate-votes map and perhaps this map of the 2004 Presidential election as divided into county voting majorities, and perhaps conjecture what they will become: What are some possible divisions?

Maybe Western Washington and Oregon and Coastal and Southern California could be "Voluntaria", itself tacitly run by Hollywood and Microsoft. Utah and Idaho might become "The Republic of Latter-day Saints". Eastern Washington down into Northern California and over through Southern Arizona should be "Goldwaterland". Northern Arizona, New Mexico, Texas and Oklahoma might be "Teximexaresercana". Montana, Wyoming and Colorado would of course be "The Freestate Confederacy". North and South Dakota clearly should be one nation, or better yet colonies of "Minneapomadipest", which would contain Minnesota, Wisconsin and Iowa. Nebraska and Kansas should simply become "Kansas". I think Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio would find enough in common despite their differences to unite as "The United Midwest". The U.P. in Michigan should just be ceded to Canada, and Alaska will incorporate with them as well. New Orleans and Southern Louisiana should become a protectorate of "Teximexaresercana", and the rest of LA, Arkansas, KY, TN, MS, AL, GA, SC, NC, and the North of Florida and all of Virginia outside the DC suburbs (so starting with Richmond and Front Royal) should revert to the C.S.A. The rest of Florida will become a Monarchy under the Eisner family, and it will take over Cuba when Castro dies, turning it into a giant resort. The DC tri-state area, West Virginia, PA, and NY (outside of NYC and surrounding counties) will create the "Atlantic Union" in the attempt to consolidate industrial and economic resources, and be forever stymied by divisive interests, and so eventually assume a Lebanon-to-Syria type relationship with "The Democratic-Socialist People's Republic of Narcissus", usually just called the "D.S.P.R.N." (that the C.S.A. will nickname, "Despairing") which will be a powerful state, but always somewhat handicapped by sharing South Africa's fate of having two capitals, Manhatten and Boston, and will include the former states of MA, Rhode Island, VT, NH, and Maine, as well as Southern Ontario which will secede from Canada joining the D.S.P.R.N.; most major media businesses will relocate there. Hawaii will leave for Japan, and all our Pacific territories will become independent republics, as will Puerto Rico. Lastly, Nevada will become a military oligarchy, where most of the people from D.C.'s old State Department and Federal Agencies, and most high-ranking Military officers of the former U.S.A., will reside; using the profits from Casinos and further-liberalized prostitution statutes they create a Spartan-like culture, and Vegas remains a tourist mecca for citizens of other interested nations.

Suburbia, redux

Tom at Disputations (which, despite our disagreements, I still recommend as a terrific blog-stop) has commented again on my islands and oases reference to Pope Benedict's statement: that "because there is a consumerist culture that wants to block us from living according to the Creator’s plan, we must have the courage to first create islands and oases, and then great landscapes of Catholic culture in which life follows the design of the Creator."

The whole discussion also surrounds my "critique" of suburbia. Since I've sinned against the virtue of brevity too often, let me see if I can summarize the fundamentals of my stance.


1. When I refer to "suburbia" I am manipulating the culturally significant symbol of "the suburbs" for a convenient reference to the dominant ethos of the culture of death as it is typically instantiated in bourgeois America, with all its attendant parts (i.e. particular practices, typical mindsets, media-influenced values and ideals, usual artifacts, etc.). It seems this ethos is easily and generally recognizable. Since "suburbia" is a kind of universal or general label, it does have shortcomings and failures in application. The symbolic reference "suburbia" is itself not so important; what is, is the cultural ethos and its typical instantiation that I think it refers to, what the Pope calls "a consumerist culture". I do not think this ethos is a disparate collection of heterogeneous fragments flowing from conflicting principles; rather I think that "suburbia" makes sense--it is organically ordered moving logically from shared fundamental principles, and that "the suburbs" are one notable (or infamous) conclusion of this logic. If you think that the culture of death just isn't typically defined and instantiated in America, nor organically ordered, then alright, that's what you need to argue.

2. Seperate from point #1, I also think it is arguable that the suburbs, considered rather, just under the formal object of architecture, is something worth criticizing. This would be an architectural-sociological argument, which could in fact be informed by point #1 (although the argument could rest on purely architectual-aesthetic premises). Such arguments are in fact made by new-urbanists and Wendell Berry types, with which I would largely agree.

3. Apposite Disputations's critique of my heroic islands and oasis argument: analogous to the way St. Thomas calls charity the form of the virtues, and the principle which implicitly contains the whole law--although the principle itself transcends the minimal requirements of any law--and which is epitomized in the counsels (themselves not laws), so too would I view that ideal to which human community is ordered to, that is, the People of God. There is no other ideal or pinciple to which human political life is ordered to. An argument that would claim that human community or political life is only ordered to the temporal/natural, while the counsels are ordered to the supernatural/otherworldly interior life of man, would in my opinion contain a basic confusion of the relationship between the natural and supernatural, and seek to reassert the two-storied view of nature and grace with the concomitant thesis of "pure nature". Every human vocation is to be informed by "the spirit of the counsels", even if they cannot fully partake of thier vowed-actuality (Garrigou-Lagrange said as much) right now; and so too human community must conform to the spirit of the People of God, even if it cannot fully conform to its eschatological reality right now. If you claim that political life, human community, and living infrastructure only concerns man's earthly life and vocation--I reply, I know of no such life and vocation: man in this historical order (and furthermore, the entire cosmos) has only one end and life and vocation to which he is called: the life of the Blessed Trinity, the spousal union of Jesus Christ and his Church.

4. I would resist the identification of "normative" with suburban bourgeois America, with the attendent markers of "mini-van," "sitcom television," "Walmart," "central air," "9 to 5 job," etc. I don't know if there really is such a thing as normative here; rather, it seems to me there are typical styles and choices in a mass-produced consumer culture of media and corporate driven homogeneity. I would call the vocation to marriage and family "normative". Until we can separate the two, and realize that what the culture tells us is "normative" for families is really just their (i.e. the culture's) preference, I don't think the creation of islands and oases can happen. I do think there needs to be some radical re-imagining of what communites and towns, households and family-life can be, unshackled from the stifiling efforts of the media-driven illusion of popular culture that chokes the imagination and limits the possibilites for choice. This is why I point to Catholic Worker, The Lord's Ranch, Family Missions Company, the International Theological Institute, etc.: as an exercise in imagination, not nomisitc prescription. Let me repeat: we need a radical re-imagining of what family life and local community can and should look like according to viable modes, taking into account the environment of a culture that is itself inimical to the realization of authentic family life and local community, and actively attacks and prevents such attempts and re-imaginings with a coordinated and calculated cultural assault down to its most minute forms (e.g. the "Happy-Meal"). The reason I have been such an enthusiastic proponent of Crunchy Cons is precisely because I see it as one example of the kind of re-imagining that is seriously needed today.

Mirror of Justice makes you think


Good post by Mr. Berg, esq., over at Mirror of Justice. It's about the growing income disparity in America, and its effect on social solidarity:

Catholic social doctrine clearly regards some level of income disparity as the inevitable product of morally commendable freedom and initiative; moreover, you obviously can't identify a precise point at which income disparity becomes too great. But let me try a few suggestions why large and growing income disparity may be ground for concern in itself, and not just as a symptom of other things like a high poverty rate.

One is that great disparity seems likely to make it harder for people to practice the value of solidarity, that is, "see[ing] the 'other'-whether a person, people or nation-not just as some kind of instrument, . . . but as our 'neighbor,' a 'helper'(cf. Gn. 2:18-20), to be made a sharer on a par with ourselves in the banquet of life to which all are equally invited by God." Solicitudo Rei Socialis, para. 39. Again, this is not talking about equal results; but the more that different classes of people lead entirely different lives determined (heavily at least) by income -- with radical differences in housing, schooling, neighborhoods, work, leisure, transportation, and almost everything else -- the more they will find it hard to sympathize with each other (especially the rich to sympathize with those of modest means). Around the time of our discussion last year, Michael Kinsley wrote about threats to "the role of civil equality as a consolation prize for economic inequality":

[W]hole areas of life that were part of everyday democracy have fallen to the empire of money. People increasingly go to schools with people of their own class, live in class-sifted neighborhoods, hold their Fourth of July picnics in their own back yards rather than the public park.

Of course Catholic doctrine calls on all people to develop empathy across the lines that will always be there. But realistically, people will find it harder to do so when income and life-condition disparities are really large. This effect seems independent of what percentage of the population falls below some absolute measure of poverty.


The image at top has to do with the Gini coefficient: see the Wikipedia article, and the global map of income disparity.

7.19.2006

The embryonic stem-cell abomination of desolation

Congress passed a bill yesterday for the funding of embryonic stem-cell research, that would allow the destruction of human embryos for extracting stem-cells that could perhaps offer some medical and scientific benefit. Today President Bush used the first veto of his tenure to stop the bill from being written into law. His reasoning was, such a bill would permit and encourage the destruction of human life. The President spoke plainly:

"This bill would support the taking of innocent human life in the hope of finding medical benefits for others. It crosses a moral boundary that our decent society needs to respect. So I vetoed it."

So, if the polls are accurate, the majority of American seem to support doing evil so that good may result from it. And so do a majority of their elected representatives in the House and Senate. But in this case, President Bush did not think that this was an ethical line we could cross.

Green is for two yeas supporting the bill in the Senate, grey for a split, red for two nays.
N.B. "Red-state" America has gotten a good bit smaller.


From the New York Times:
“Less than 24 hours after the Senate passed groundbreaking stem cell legislation, President Bush is set to defy the will of the American people and crush the hopes of millions who suffer from debilitating conditions and diseases like diabetes, spinal cord injury, Lou Gehrig’s, Parkinson’s and others,” said Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the Senate minority leader.

“We are not going to give up this fight for stem cell research,” Mr. Reid said. “We’re going to press Republicans to override a veto, just as we pressed Republicans to bring it to the Senate floor, and just as we pressed Republicans to get it passed. We didn’t give up then. We’re not going to give up now.”

Mr. Reid said that most of the 44 Democratic senators had sent a letter to Senator Bill Frist of Tennessee, the majority leader and one of the 19 Republicans who voted for the stem cell bill on Tuesday. “We’re so hopeful that he’ll join us in this fight,” Mr. Reid said.

Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts also sounded a note of defiance. “We will not give in,” he said. “We are going to continue this battle, and we have every intention of success in winning this battle for families in our country and for people all over the world.”

Senator Richard J. Durbin of Illinois, the Senate minority whip, said the strategy of the Republicans who oppose the stem cell bill was clear: “It is their belief that if the president vetoes this bill quickly and does it early, that people across America will forget by November.”

And Senator Hatch, the Utah Republican who usually sides with the White House, also expressed disappointment, telling The Associated Press that the veto “sets back embryonic stem cell research another year or so.”

That the president would use the first veto of his tenure on the stem-cell bill was “confounding,” said Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New York. Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, said it was dismaying that Mr. Bush “heralds bipartisanship and then snuffs it out in his first opportunity.”

Representative Nancy Pelosi of California, the House minority leader, said that the veto amounted to “saying ‘no’ to hope.” It is up to members of Congress, she said, to “represent their constituents” and vote to override the veto.
Watching a bit of the coverage on President Bush's veto, I was amazed to see opponents pull out nearly every informal fallacy to distract people from the facts of the matter. Amazing. The whole thing amounts to something like this:

We have an historic opportunity to save the lives of millions.
--but I think this is murder.
But everyone knows someone with Alzheimer's or Parkinson's.
--but I think it's murder.
How can you deprive so many suffering the chance to have a cure?
--but it seems to be murder.
Everyone is supporting this; tremendous bipartison support!
--destroying embryos is murder.
How can you be soley concerned with reaffirming your core constituency at the expense of life?
--the taking of innocent human life is evil.

And so on.

Case in point, most people today are utilitarians/consequentialists: there is no reason why the worst kind of evil should not be done if it can be of some proportional good benefit.

What is even more elucidating (and scandalizing) is to observe the many so-called pro-life elected officials who voted for this bill (e.g. John McCain). If anyone wants a litmus test, here it is. Want to know whether someone is really pro-life? How do they feel about embryonic stem-cell research?

Bush's supporters were referred to as "ultra-conservative" Evangelicals or Catholics. Oh, but they forget to mention the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops!

And the National Catholic Bioethics Center explains wht this can be even worse than abortion.

I'll close with two great quotes from Walker Percy, MD, on the issue.

From "A View Of Abortion, With Something To Offend Everybody":
The current con, perpetuated by some jurists, some editorial writers, and some doctors, is that since there is no agreement about the beginning of human life, it is therefore a private religious or philosophical decision and therefore the states and the courts can do nothing about it. This is a con. I will not presume to speculate on who is conning whom and for what purpose. But I do submit that religion, philosophy, and private opinion have nothing to do with this issue. I further submit that it is a commonplace of modern biology, known to every high-school student and no doubt to you the reader as well, that the life of every individual organism, human or not, begins when the chromosomes of the sperm fuse with the chromosomes of the ovum to form a new DNA complex that theneceforth directs the ontogenesis of the organism.

Such vexed subjects as the soul, God, and the nature of man are not at issue. What we are talking about and what nobody I know would deny is the clear continuum that exists in the life of every individual from the moment of fertilization of a single cell.
And from "An Unpublished Letter To The Times":
In a word, certain consequences, perhaps unforeseen, follow upon the acceptance of the principle of the destruction of human life for what may appear to be the most admirable social reasons.

One does not have to look back very far in history for an example of such consequences. Take democratic Germany in the 1920s. Perhaps the most influential book published in German in the first quarter of this century was entitled The Justification of the Destruction of Life Devoid of Value. Its co-authors were the distinguished jurist Karl Binding and the prominent psychiatrist Alfred Hoche. Neither Binding nor Hoche had ever heard of Hitler or the Nazis. Nor, in all likelihood, did Hitler ever read the book. He didn't have to.

The point is that the ideas expressed in the book and the policies advocated were the product not of Nazi ideology but rather of the best minds of the pre-Nazi Weimar Republic--physicians, social scientists, jurists and the like, who with the best secular intentions wished to improve the lot, socially and genetically, of the German people--by getting rid of the unfit and the unwanted.

It is hardly necessary to say what use the Nazis made of these ideas.

I would not wish to be understood as implying that the respected American institutions I have named are similar to corresponding pre-Nazi institutions.

But I do suggest that once the line is crossed, once the principle gains acceptance--juridically, medically, socially--innocent human life can be destroyed for whatever reason, for the most admirable socioeconomic, medical, or social reasons--then it does not take a prophet to predict what will happen next, or if not next, then sooner or later. At any rate, a warning is in order. Depending on the disposition of the majority and the opinion polls--now in favor of allowing women to get rid of unborn and unwanted babies--it is not difficult to imagine an electorate or a court ten years, fifty years from now, who would favor getting rid of useless old people, retarded children, anti-social blacks, illegal Hispanics, gypsies, Jews...

Why not?--if that is what is wanted by the majority, the polled opinion, the polity of the time.

7.18.2006

On a lighter note

To tie or not to tie... What's the deal with wearing ties today? So many options and patterns, pulled up tight or hung loosely, windsor or four-in-hand, with a buttondown or spread collar... It's tough. The CSMonitor has an interesting article on the whole phenomenon:
"In some places (church, restaurants, college) the tie seems to be vanishing alongside the polar ice caps (if you believe Al Gore). Sightings can be especially rare during the hot summer months. But in other places (law offices, stock brokerages, hospitals) ties are reappearing faster than Whac-A-Mole on steroids. "Ties are both coming back and going out at the same time," says Gerald Andersen, executive director of the Men's Dress Furnishings Association in New York. The changes are both real (not imagined) and modified by regional differences (up generally in the Midwest and East; down, for the most part, in the West), he and others say. The personal whims of revolving CEOs can also figure in - no matter what profession.

"Both perceptions are correct," Mr. Andersen says. But with a kind of defiance to those of the now-defunct dotcom era who had all but deep-sixed the necktie in favor of T-shirts, beards, shorts, and sandals, he paraphrases Mark Twain: "The reports of the death of the necktie have been greatly exaggerated."

Read the whole article here.

An important first principle to remember:

Before I get a chance to blog on what's going on in the Middle East, I want to recall an important principle that is often forgotten when politics is discussed, the principle that is the foundation for any Catholic consideration of morality and therefore politics: that evil can never, ever, be intended, for any reason.

When I was younger I used to read a lot of Tom Clancy. If a tightly wound plot, espionage, and gadgetry are your thing, he's fun. But he's a bit less pleasing to read now. Clancy does not shy away from a good guy/bad guy kind of characterization--it's clear who they are. The good guys, however, find themselves in a dangerous world where many diplomats, agents, provaceteurs, soldiers, terrorists, etc. pursue malicious goals with no moral compunction.

Clancy's heroes, on the other hand, are notable for their boy-scout warrior code, their sense of fair-play, honor, concern for noble values and traditional institutions like the family. There are many minor characters of course who fill in the pages who exhibit more of a muddled sense of right and wrong, but the major characters nonetheless are on either side of the moral hemisphere.

Except for one thing: in every Clancy novel the good characters are faced with situations, problems, where they have to compromise and do something seemingly immoral for the sake of a greater good. Most of Clancy's works can be read as a sort of apologetic for this kind of statecraft, and particularly for the importance and need of state agencies (like the CIA) that are willing and able to bend a few rules so lives can be saved: a realpolitik. The moral of his stories: sometimes you just have to get your hands dirty, and we should be grateful that some are willing to do this; we live in peace and security because of their willingness.

Many people I talk to, people who would purport to have an objective sense of right and wrong, happen to share the same sense of morality as the Clancy good guys when push comes to shove, which fundamentally is the utilitarian one: the right thing to do is a consequence of a calculation where we figure out how to achieve the best for the greatest amount of people. Accordingly, in such a moral calculus, no action is strictly "off-limits". In certain grave situations, even heinous acts may need to take place to save lives. It's what I call, the Tom Clancy (or perhaps, the Jack Ryan) morality--which is really not all that different (except for the details of their personal lives) with the James Bond morality.

The Catholic understanding of morality is different.

What most don't seem to get is, the Church holds that evil can never be done for the sake of a good end. Full stop.

Furthermore, some actions, like the taking of innocent life, are always evil, and so we can never rightly intend such actions. This is why, for example, the Church has always opposed the reasoning that led to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These actions are usually defended with a nuanced moral calculus, that amounts to the criterion of saving more American and Japanese lives in the long run. No matter. The intended (and as G.E.M. Anscombe pointed out, what you knowingly do you willingly intend) targeting of non-combatents in war is always evil, as is any taking of innocent life. It simply can never be justified. The torture of even one innocent babe to save the lives of the whole world, and other moral scenarios, illustrate this.

So in discussions of war, statecraft, realpolitik, particularly apposite the whole Middle East-Iraq-Israel situation, many find themselves apoplectic when confronted with things the Vatican says in response. Why? Well, my guess is they have implicitly adopted a kind of consequentialist thinking that says, sometimes things are so bad that you've got to do bad to clean it up.

But the Church says, the stakes are never so bad that evil becomes justified. And it wants to be heard loud and clear. And it knows and wants others to know well the many evil consequences that always come from war.

A deep consideration of this principle is critical for understanding the Church's invective against war: the principle that evil can never be done, that is the reason why the Church can say war is "a failure," "always a defeat for humanity," "the failure of all true humanism," "an adventure without return," etc. War as it is now considered by the Magisterium can only be legitimate if it is a defensive action. (See CSD, 496, 497)

The Church teaches that "violence is never a proper response." This strikes many as limp-wristed, if not naive and simply stupid. What about self-defense? they say. Well, even St. Thomas noted that a private individual can never intend to take another life; only the state in certain circumstances can even do that. Even in defense, a private individual cannot intend to kill; he can only intend to defend with force. I won't get into the differences here; if they are not obvious, well, that's a whole other discussion (cf. the end of this post).

Violence as aggression however is what the Church is condemning; and this is always evil. Beginning a war, or covert ops, or whatever, for some good end, can never be justified. This does put most statecraft outside the pale of Catholic morality. Yes, it's true--part of the inherent problem of the modern state.

The Church is clear: "One may not do evil so that good may result from it."(CCC 1761) For individuals or states. The use of force (as distinguished from violence) can only be used by the state as a defensive measure, and then only according to strict rules (e.g. The reasons for just war).

I am very much pro-Israel, and quite sympathetic to its concerns. However, if Israel decides to wage war which permissively results in the deaths of non-combatants, this cannot be justified. The reasons for war may be justified, but certainly the kind of warcraft (in war) that relies on permitting collateral damage is evil and unjust. If it is decided that proportionality can be ignored, this too is an evil.

Admittedly, the situation is more complex with terrorism and urban warfare. However the tactics are conceived, it is still true, that evil may never be intentionally done, for any reason.

-------------------------
[If someone wants to argue for double effect, this is typically a red-herring, or perhaps just simply a misunderstanding of double effect. For St. Thomas, double effect can only apply to unintended consequences. (Cf. G.E.M. Anscombe's point, very important, that what we knowingly do we always intend. Also cf. St. Thomas on the difference between ignorance and involuntariness.)

Here is St. Thomas's brief discussion of the issue, in ST II-II 64.7. I find most people are surprised by his conclusions:

I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained above (43, 3; I-II, 12, 1). Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in "being," as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because according to the jurists, "it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defense." Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of another's. But as it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for the public authority acting for the common good, it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.
Consequences may be anticipated or guessed at, but an act can only ever be justified if it is good or at least morally neutral. If some evil may result in an action, as an unintended consequence, a side effect, the good that is intended must be a result of the act itself and not the peripheral evil. The evil cannot be intentionally willed; only guessed at and tolerated, proportionally.

Double effect only applies to good actions, never evil ones
.

And if the guess amounts to, more evil may result from this act (i.e. proportionality), or even, some evil will certainly result from this action, then it cannot be done (since evil can never, ever, willfully be done). In any situation, the moral actor must always try to avoid all evil that is in his power, perhaps even by abstaining to act if proportionality demands. Since we have minds that can anticipate future consequences, we can be held responsible for evil that we did, or should of, anticipated as probable. (e.g. why a drunk driver who has lost the capacity to reason well is still held responsible for what he does, based on the fact that he should have known better; or why someone in a fight who hits someone so hard that they accidentally kill them is guilty of murder and not simply manslaughter--the response, I didn't mean to, as any parent knows, is usually fallacious) A fallacy in consequentialism is the denial of any distinction between forseen and intended consequences. Here is an excerpt of a reviewer summarizing Anscombe's point:

In Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe singled out Henry Sidgwick for taking a step in thought with fatal consequences. He held any foreseen consequence of a voluntary act to be intended. She distinguishes a foreseen effect of an action from the intention with which it was done. The intention does not lie only in the end for which it was done; it comprises the chosen means as well, and the act is bad if those means were bad. But the action may have an unintended but foreseen side-effect. The end was not attained through the side-effect; if it had been, that subsidiary effect would have been the means, or part of the means, to that end.

Anscombe accepts the principle of double effect, which she prefers to call that of “side-effects”, but thinks that of itself it does not say when an act with a bad foreseen but unintended side-effect is permissible; it merely allows that it may be permissible. Further principles are required to determine when the side-effect renders the action bad. Obviously it does so when an alternative course of action was to hand, or when the end is trivial;

Anscombe suggests that it may also do so when the side-effect is both immediate and certain.

She complains of the abuse of double effect by some Catholic moralists, who think bad actions can be excused by “directing the intention”. This means selecting one of several descriptions under which the act is intentional, and nominating that as one’s intention, so that all else becomes a side-effect.

Here is a great article on Anscombe if anyone wants to know more about her; one of the greatest Catholic philosophers ever.]

How very sad

[warning: mature content following!]

This is sort of an addendum to the post below. I had mentioned John Updike's novel Villages, and how it could serve as an epitaph to his oeuvre, all his works in their concern with the post-war bourgeois American life and culture. The novel is rather biographical as well. It is about an old man who nostalgically looks back on his life, and finds the trace of narrative and unity in the several sexual relationships he has had, living in several different places in the Northeast. In it, I found a paragraph that epitomizes like no other I have read how pathetic and banal and really tragic is what modern man has convinced himself to be :
Women's natures are very large, he early sensed, to seek sex amid the world's perils, in the face of so many wise societal discouragements. The force that parts their legs overrules modesty and prudence and common sense. Women f**k, his provisional conclusion was, because, like men, they are trapped in a biological universe where the species that do not propogate disappear; the traits the survivors harbor--lustiness, speed, canniness, camoflauge--are soaked in these disappearences, these multitudinous deaths. Sex is a programmed delirium that rolls back death with death's own substance; it is the black space between the stars given sweet substance in our veins and crevices. The parts of ourselves conventional decency calls shameful are exalted. We are told that we shine, that we are splendid, and the naked bodies we were given in the bloody moment of birth hold all the answers that another, the other, desires, now and forever.
The only riposte I can provide here is Pascal, writing about the immortality of the soul and death:
But as for those who pass their life without thinking of this ultimate end of life, and who, for this sole reason that they do not find within themselves the lights which convince them of it, neglect to seek them elsewhere, and to examine thoroughly whether this opinion is one of those which people receive with credulous simplicity, or one of those which, although obscure in themselves, have nevertheless a solid and immovable foundation, I look upon them in a manner quite different.

This carelessness in a matter which concerns themselves, their eternity, their all, moves me more to anger than pity; it astonishes and shocks me; it is to me monstrous. I do not say this out of the pious zeal of a spiritual devotion. I expect, on the contrary, that we ought to have this feeling from principles of human interest and self-love; for this we need only see what the least enlightened persons see.

We do not require great education of the mind to understand that here is no real and lasting satisfaction; that our pleasures are only vanity; that our evils are infinite; and, lastly, that death, which threatens us every moment, must infallibly place us within a few years under the dreadful necessity of being for ever either annihilated or unhappy.

There is nothing more real than this, nothing more terrible. Be we as heroic as we like, that is the end which awaits the world. Let us reflect on this and then say whether it is not beyond doubt that there is no good in this life but in the hope of another; that we are happy only in proportion as we draw near it; and that, as there are no more woes for those who have complete assurance of eternity, so there is no more happiness for those who have no insight into it.

Surely then it is a great evil thus to be in doubt, but it is at least an indispensable duty to seek when we are in such doubt; and thus the doubter who does not seek is altogether completely unhappy and completely wrong. And if besides this he is easy and content, professes to be so, and indeed boasts of it; if it is this state itself which is the subject of his joy and vanity, I have no words to describe so silly a creature.

7.17.2006

Suburbia: attempts at a definition

Some have pressed upon me to define what I mean by suburbia. They realize the slippery nature of the reality I'm pointing too; furthermore, they think that some if not many of my generalizations, particularly the moral ones, are imprecise if not mistaken. My claim has been that suburbia, as a "place", embodies and instantiates a host of structures, forms, practices, habits--in other words, a whole ethos--that, as a place and aggregate of buildings, symbols, and relations, is virtually inimical to human flourishing, to the culture of life. On the contrary, my interlocutors have said, it is not that bad, and beyond this, a much more muddled reality that just cannot admit of such universal claims. Moreover, cities are really not so rosey after all, often dangerous, polluted, and containing just as many occasions that can corrupt and make an excellent holy life quite difficult, not to mention, raising a family.

Alright. I admit that I have been indulging in generalizations. Here is a sketch toward a definition (rather than a precise definition), perhaps too ranging and even rambling, but here it goes:

True enough, "suburb" is such a fluid concept that generalizations may do more harm than good.

Then again, the concepts "urban," "city," "farm," "ex-urb," "neighborhood," "street," "household," "home," even "family" could be said to admit the same fluidity and imprecision. In discussing "place," because it by nature can admit of so much difference and variation even within agreed upon boundaries, general terms and descriptions will always remain imprecise.

The neighborhood the blogger the reluctant lawyer lives in, as far as I can tell, sounds pretty good. It certainly sounds better than Georgetown. And as he seems to know, often these scenarios involve making the best of a geography that is prior to our wishes and preferences. The choice of a home is more often the consequence of factors like affordability, proximity to extended family or workplace, simple availability, quality of local parish and diocese. Yes, granted.

And if by "suburb" we mean Nassau county, I believe it is possible to raise a holy family that engages and evangelizes the neighborhood and culture. If we mean Queen Anne Hill, Seattle, I think it may happen there too. Anne Arundel and Calvert counties. Yes, it's possible.

The question is: are we merely concerned with the possible here? Or does discussion of the better, the more propitious, the beneficial, carry important weight? In the day to day decisions of the family, these criteria seem quite operative. Should we buy just any bread for peanut butter sandwiches? The cheapest? Least amount of calories? Tastiest? What, after all, do we want in bread for our children? How about clothing? Is it arbitrary? Should I allow my daughter to wear what most of her peers wear, so she can be popular? Should I even encourage her at all in her choices here? Or is it better to give her a credit card with a $500 limit and simply let her exercise her freedom and responsibility on her own at the Mall?

These are rhetorical examples, but I think, fair ones. In either case, the options are often limited by the practical exigencies of life. And yet, Catholic families often feel called to stretch themselves beyond such demands, not simply content to do what is easiest, or even, most practical; they often make sacrifices, even heroic ones, for the sake of greater goods. Good Catholic families do this all the time. Such practical reasoning becomes intuitive for them. The question, are we simply doing this because everyone else does, because the culture or media simply accepts it as normative? needs to be asked. I can think of choices many of my friends have made in childrearing, for instance, against the norm, often provoking misunderstanding and tension with relatives, doctors, whomever.

The first point I wish to make is simply, the choice we make of where to live, of what sort of buildings and symbols to surround ourselves with, of the communities we will be a part of, etc. are decisions we make based on criteria that may or may not reflect our desire to flourish as human beings, and form our families in an atmosphere of influence that is most conducive to holiness, innocence, joy, etc. These choices concerning "place" are usually not completely forced upon us. The question then remains, what criteria are most important?

The question of whether to live in the city, the suburbs, a small town, or the country (and the thousand points inbetween) is an important one.

Considering the options, there are probably even better categories that might elucidate what is really at stake in this choice.

1. Natural vs. artificial communities. Towns and cities are in fact subject to a kind of organic structure, and reflect (or not) the natural growth and bonds that happen in human communities. Of course, a town must start somewhere, from scratch. But I do not think it is a revelation to suggest there is a difference of kind rather than degree from a town that grows naturally to one that is planned abstractly in advance and then sieved open to a mass influx emigrants.

2. Single zoning vs. Mixed zoning. Is the community exclusively residential, with commercial opportunities not within walking distance? Does the local industry (if there is even one) demand ever greater time away from home? Does the residential and commercial structure of the town bear an intrinsic relationship to the commerce and industry of the community? Is art, trade, commerce and production made a more intimate part of household life through close proximity?

3. Beauty vs. Ugliness. Are the buildings all of a certain cookie-cutter design. Are they ideologically subversive? Do they tend to depress and make weary? Or are they diverse and interesting, reflecting ingenuity and creativity? Do they inspire? Is their function symbolically attendant in their architecture, or is it contrarily subverted by minimalist designs? Is nature properly integrated into the community? Are there fields to play on, trees to sit under, is there water to relax by? Are parks an important part of the town? Or is it a concrete circuit-board? Does the town convey the importance of tradition and continuity with the past, or is it gauche and trendy, pointing toward the ephemeral?

4. Pedestrian vs. Automobile. Does the town encourage walking, personal interaction with neighbors, does it make easier time spent outdoors. Are their benches and nice places to sit and talk. Are their places for festivals, fairs, markets? Or is the community catered toward the automobile, toward entering and exiting as expediently as possible, where the only options remain staying inside, in cars, or out of town?

These are merely examples of other categories. And I think cities, small towns, rural communities, maybe even suburbs, could be divided along such lines.

The point is not a kind of community or town as such, simply for the sake of that structure. It is: what is needed and important in a community, in a place, and where is this found and acquired?

As to suburbia, I would offer two definitions. First, as a kind of district or structure that entails planned housing over a large scale, without significant structural diversity, according to maximum affordability for the consumer and maximum profit for the developer, built on the edges of a traditional city, whether right outside or some distance away, but far enough that commercial and industrial opportunities will demand solely vehicular access, save for closer mini-malls (although these too will usually not be in walking distance), that themselves follow a similar model and aesthetic as the suburb. The homes in suburbs generally conform to the desirable model of an orderly, spaced-out interior that maximizes both convenience and ease of construction, oriented more toward a ratio of a large living and room and kitchen with less room for a plurality of bedrooms, constructed out of materials that are cheap and mass-produced and quickly assembled. The house usually must have a large garage and driveway, and most importantly, a significant front yard and even larger backyard. The backyard should be fenced.

Ex-urbs and McMansions capitalize on some of these mentioned features, to the detriment of others, imagining a kind of pseudo-estate, but for the most part still sharing the most significant essential features of the suburb.

Obviously, any one of these features may be present in any other model; as a whole, I do not think the architectural definitions are as important.

The second definition would be the one I principally intend: suburbia as a moniker for a kind of ethos that has a inspiring form or logos, a deeper meaning in which it shares in. Suburbia in this sense is the cultural identification, particularly narrowed and symbolically referred to in its buildings, social practices and behavior, values and even worldview that sums up the individualist, materialist, and hedonist bourgeois culture that most Americans aspire to. It is the dominant culture form expressed in pop culture, in television, movies, and other media. As an idea or form it is easily recognizable or identifiable by most media-conscious people, although it can admit a wide degree of difference as to particular instantiations. Wherever it sets in however, it tends to minimize difference, operating as a kind of pressure. It conceives of man as first of all an individual, who is first and foremost concerned with himself, with satisfying his own dreams and desires. It views the family as a means to this kind of satisfaction. It also sees man primarily as a consumer, and tends to reduce any kind of relationship to a "what will I get out of this" instrumentalization. It is deeply rooted in the myth of the American dream, and took its first actual instantiation in the suburbs that were built for the WWII generation of the late 40s and the 1950s. In the form of suburbia this dream became something life, wanting a house of one's own with a yard and fences where one could pursue whatever satisfactions that were available. Decorations and toys became extensions of this house, whether the barbecue or the pool or the wet bar or the big-screen TV. The maximum insulation of private space for the enjoyment of diverting activities, diverted from the boredom and inanity of the daily job. Viewing the self as necessarily entailing a host of relationships of dependency, in a family larger than the nuclear model, seeing labor as something worth doing for its own sake, not just for the sake of disposable income and vacations--the suburban ethos resists a traditional understanding of man vigorously in its alliance with marketing and television, which promote this reductionistic view of man.

Suburbia implies that man is better off insulated from his community. It symbolizes this by an actual physical insulation. Automobiles do the same thing. It may be the case that strangers don't speak to each other on trains, but as anyone who has lived in Europe and used local transit there (e.g. Rome), even if you don't talk to them, you can't ever forget who your neighbors are. In suburbia, that is precisely what is encouraged. Suburban man finds himself more and more alone. Consumerism has made the buying of stuff out to be the greatest reward of labor. As many philosophers have pointed out, it is a sickness that is cyclical and endemic. Suburbia puts a premium on convenience, and so old people are hidden away in retirement homes. The poor are rarely seen. What the suburbs reinforce is that what is most important is what you can buy, that time by yourself is most important, that things and stuff and "having" are more important than serving and giving and receiving. Life should cater to relaxation, to the automobile, and to the job--the three all serve each other, and are the greatest things we can achieve. This is the narrative, the story that the suburbs speak. And the message is heard loud and clear by the children growing up in them.

I think I could go on and on. Wikipedia also mentions some sociological consequences of suburbs:
  • Lead to the decay of central cities and their downtowns, which are left without a base of nearby middle-class residents.
  • Quickly destroy cropland, displace nature, and consume attractive countryside.
  • Increases traffic at the central area.
  • Cause a decline in the public's health, since buildings in suburbs are often so far apart that driving is the only way to get from one place to another.
  • Costly, due to the new infrastructure required for development, paid by the existing urban area.
  • Provide a limited set of housing choices.
  • Building more soulless places with no distinct identity or feeling of community.
Perhaps this is not what some wanted; I admit I'm ranging widely and not really nailing the causes and specific difference. I do think something like Suburbia is tougher to nail down. It clearly isn't simply equivalent with the culture of death. I would want to distinguish it from elitism, whether of the urban/professorial intelligentsia, or the Hollywood/ultra-rich aristocracy. It is more along the lines of David Brooks's Bobo's in Paradise (bohemian bourgeoisie); however, I feel it is even more populist than that. In a way it's so common now that it's hard to even imagine how things could be different. Of course, historically, it is radically different. Providers working away from the household; families limited to the nuclear household; the evisceration of towns and urban centers; the virtual disappearance of gardening as farming, as something as common then as surfing the internet is now.

I could just say culture of death, but I think that this is reduced in most people's minds as simply a moral or political problem. Like, the problem is people voting pro-choice, or having abortions, or doing drugs, or pre-marital sex, whatever. But I really think this is symptomatic. The deeper problem is the normative culture that most Americans share, one that is dominated by consumerist, hedonist, and materialist designs, that is remarkably self-(and not family and town) centered, that is typically alienated from its labor and work, and that is preoccupied more and more with the media and technopolic divertisments. "Suburbia" puts a clear face on the problem, an easily recognizable symbolic meaning. Unfortunately in most people's understanding it is fairly innocuous and benign as well. Hardly. It is a culture consumed by money, sex, and power, and nearly unconcerned if not ignorant of traditional religion, piety (toward the family), art, and labor. These are a conceptualization of the reality that we are very much immersed in, a culture that is deeply sick in so many ways. I suppose I don't need to convince anyone that we are living in a culture of death; what is being debated is whether this culture of death has anything to do with suburbia. Or is suburbia something neutral, like slate versus tin roofing, or oil versus acrylic paint for kitchens? My claim is that suburbia, as the aggregate of various symbols, particularly buildings and practices, that typically supports a kind of structured place or community, is perhaps the deepest cause of this culture of death. And this aggregate is not arbitrary, but has a sort of organic structure that flows from certain principles and embodied realizations of those principles that have become so common they are rarely even questioned.

(Perhaps literature can emphasize this better. John Updike has been the great chronicler of suburbia and the post-war bourgoeis dream, from Rabbit Run to his last creeping novels, like Villages. Great prose, but sad and depressing and ultimately nihilistic. But at least honest.)

In a word, suburbia is the lived and symbolic instantiation of a culture that lives as if God did not exist.

Finally, I choose the moniker "suburban" because I think the deepest nature of these problems concerns the family, the home, and labor/the workplace, all of which suburbia explicitly sought to transform from their pre-WWII models in America and did, so much so, that we can barely recognize America in old literature and movies. Eric Jacobsen has noted this:
Before the Second World War, there were no retirement homes because a person could fully participate in our society without the necessity of operating an automobile. In most neighbourhoods, grocery stores, laundromats, barbers, and coffee shops were all within walking distance of homes. There were no "soccer moms" because ball fields were distributed among the neighbourhoods of a community, and kids could walk to them. Public spaces (parks, plazas, squares, and sidewalks) used to have priority in commercial and residential developments and gave a sense of harmony and order to distinct areas. Young and old used to enjoy informal contact in non-commercial public spaces because there were interesting places to walk and sidewalks upon which they could walk.

We've forgotten these things because we have spared no expense and made every allowance for the automobile and its seductive promise of mobility, power, and freedom. We've seen the promise of auto utopia unravel before us in the form of an endless sprawl of tract home developments, mega stores, and subdivisions. But we've been at a loss as to how to escape this decline because we have forgotten so much about how we used to build community on a human scale. We've settled for a kind of resigned acceptance of this dismal trajectory.
And I believe the primary response to these problems needs to be an in-formed one, an incarnational one. I most definitely do not think the answer is, most importantly, just be converted in your heart, and live in the world seemingly detached. I agree there is a part of the Church that says something like this, but I think the reasons behind it are more Platonist and gnostic, and are content with a sort of separation of nature and grace that would leave the explicitly religious as supernatural and the everyday, the mundane, the temporal as natural and passing.

It is necessary to have a converted heart, but I think this always/already entails an incarnated reality, that is, it flows from an embodied gift, reception, and commitment. But that is still not even sufficient.

Pope Paul VI said: "The split between the Gospel and culture is without a doubt the tragedy of our time." Therefore, "every effort must be made to ensure a full evangelization of culture, or more correctly, of cultures. They have to be regenerated by an encounter with the Gospel. But this encounter will not take place if the Gospel is not proclaimed."

And by proclaimed I take it to mean more than simply a vocal offering. Modern man must be confronted by a new culture, a new Christian culture of life, he must be confronted by its forms and symbols and practices and structures. The New Evangelization precisely means this: the rebuilding and transformation of a new Christian culture.

Alasdair MacIntyre said that "beliefs are expressed in and through rituals and ritual dramas, masks and modes of dress, the ways in which houses are structured and villages and towns laid out, and of course by actions in general." It is typically Cartesian to limit religion to mere intellectual convictions. Rather, Christianity is a culturally embodied narrative and view of the world. N.T. Wright has some good observations here:
"Worldviews provide the stories through which human beings view reality.... Second, from these stories one can in principle discover how to answer the basic questions that determine human existence; who are we, what are we, what is wrong, and what is the solution.... Third, the stories that express worldviews, and the answers which it provides to the questions of identity, environment, evil and eschatology, are expressed in cultural symbols.... Fourth, worldviews include a praxis, a way-of-being-in-the-world....Worldviews are thus the basic stuff of human existence, the lens through which the world is seen, the blueprint for how one should live in it, and above all the sense of identity and place which enables human beings to be what they are."
Suburbia is a malignant worldview; it is perhaps the prime symbol of the materialist-consumerist secular mainstream American culture, that itself seeks to destroy and alienate the authentic and real cultural fragments that remain.

The New Catholic Encyclopedia defines culture as follows:
"Culture consists of patterns explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional ideas and especially their attached values; cultural systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action."
If I may, the culture of death is the more generic definition, particularly in its materialist, individualist, hedonist, and consumerist nature, and suburbia is its most powerful and influential specific instantiation. It is a story, a narrative, an answer to existential questions, a view of man in the world and his obligations therein, and an embodied way of being in the world. Its epitomatic symbols are the automobile, the television, and the shopping mall. It is not the exclusive instantiation of this culture, as cities and corporate farms can embody it as well. But I would see it as the privileged root. No one enjoys the suburbs, for good reason; no one takes vacations to see them, like they do to see towns in old Europe, or New England, or other great urban centers. They are not a natural way to live, and in this culture they are an essential part of the whole bourgeois American dream.

I first arrived at my judgment of suburbia inductively. I think the isolation of man is the greatest sickness of modernity. As Gaudium et Spes states, "man can only find himself through a sincere gift of himself." It is in community, in serving others, in receiving the gift of another's life and talents, in caring for the young, the sick, the elderly, the handicapped, the suffering, and in turn being cared for, it is there that Christianity really flourishes. I understand that right now every person, every family cannot pick up and move to a commune, to a L'Arche community, cannot start a Catholic worker community, a Catholic school, etc. But I do believe that what Pope Benedict was talking about with islands and oases were things like those communities. It is from there that the rest of society and the world can be transformed. And I do think it is a both/and. But the founding and constituting of communities in these dark ages, as MacIntyre emphasized, that is the heroic task needed today. And I believe that rejecting the suburban model, and its attendant materialism, consumerism and individualism is paramount. Again, there is no rejecting the culture of death as a mere idea: it is the rejection of its embodied forms, structures, practices, and institutions that is crucial.

Furthermore, we need to think about how "place" matters, as Jacobsen rightly emphasizes:
We need to rethink an eschatology that is not over-influenced by the privatized image of the American dream or by the Edenesque longing for virgin wilderness. We need an eschatology that takes human community (and its built form) seriously. The churches we build, the houses we live in, the stores at which we shop, and the important spatial connections between all these things represent a form of proclamation that we can no longer ignore. It is time for the church to develop a theology of place....
Cardinal Ratzinger had some words of encouragement back in 1986 in the Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation to those of us who are committed to this task, however difficult, of creating a new culture of life:
The love which guides commitment must henceforth bring into being new forms of solidarity. To the accomplishment of these tasks urgently facing the Christian conscience, all people of good will are called. It is the truth of the mystery of salvation at work today in order to lead redeemed humanity towards the perfection of the Kingdom which gives true meaning to the necessary efforts for liberation in the economic, social and political orders and which keeps them from falling into new forms of slavery.

It is true that before the immensity and the complexity of the task, which can require the gift of self even to an heroic degree, many are tempted to discouragement, scepticism or the recklessness of despair. A formidable challenge is made to hope, both theological and human. The loving Virgin of the Magnificat, who enfolds the Church and humanity in her prayer, is the firm support of hope. For in her we contemplate the victory of divine love which no obstacle can hold back, and we discover to what sublime freedom God raises up the lowly. Along the path which she shows us, the faith which works through love must go forward with great resolve.

A different kind of solution to the Middle East crisis?

I understand this may come across as simplisitc to some. But I honestly think that these are the only sort of solutions that will ultimately succeed. These solutions are explicitly in the spirit of Bl. Charles de Foucauld, and that great prayer of ven. J.H. Newman, that is daily recited by the Missionaries of Charity:
Dear Jesus, help us to spread your fragrance everywhere we go.

Flood our souls with your spirit and life.

Penetrate and possess our whole being so utterly that our lives may only be a radiance of yours.

Shine through us, and be so in us, that every soul we come
in contact with may feel your presence in our soul.

Let them look up and see no longer us but only Jesus!

Stay with us, and then we shall begin to shine as you shine;
so to shine as to be a light to others; the light O Jesus,
will be all from you, none of it will be ours;
it will be you, shining on others through us.

Let us thus praise you in the way you love best: by
shining on those around us.

Let us preach you without preaching, not by words
but by our example, by the catching force, the
sympathetic influence of what we do, the evident fullness
of the love our hearts bear to you.

Amen

"The Church teaches that true peace is made possible only through forgiveness and reconciliation."[Compendium of Social Doctrine (CSD), 517] I plan on blogging more, later, on the war in the Middle East. But as a sort of prolegomena, I think it wise to remind what really creates peace. It is a first principle that bears repeating: peace is not merely the absence of conflict or absence of war, but is far deeper and encompassing: the tranquility of order. Furthermore, it is an order that only grace can bring. Yes, peace presupposes justice and structures that serve the common good. But even more...
"True and lasting peace is more a matter of love than of justice, because the function of justice is merely to do away with obstacles to peace: the injury done or the damage caused. Peace itself, however, is an act and results only from love." [Pius XII; CSD 494]
The only true and lasting peace we can bring to the Middle East is the peace of the Gospel, a peace that begins in the love we can give to our neighbors, in peace and reconciliation and hospitality. If someone asks me why we do not have peace in the Middle East, I answer, because we don't have many missionaries, because we haven't really begun to evangelize and serve the Muslims. Because we don't yet have enough Charles de Foucaulds.

But here is a start: a great example of a Jesuit priest who started a monastery of sorts in Syria, creating a ecumenical house of hospitality. Here's an excerpt from this article:

[Fr. Dall’Oglio] came back to Rome for philosophy and theology studies, but he spent every summer somewhere in the Arab world. And he not only learned what Islam was, he learned to love it too, not least from the writings of the Catholic Islamic scholar Louis Massignon (1883–1962) and Catholic Islamic monk Charles de Foucauld (1858–1916).

Dall'Oglio produced a doctoral dissertation at Rome's Gregorian University called "Hope in Islam." He was ordained a priest in the Syriac Catholic Rite and then moved to his first assignment—to Islam, to Syria, where he eventually came upon his future monastery.

Dall'Oglio dug into his backpack to find a picture of Deir Mar Musa, a long shot of a fortress-like complex built on top of a cliff. It was first constructed, he said, in the sixth century, frescoed in the eleventh century, and abandoned in the nineteenth century, then given to him by the Catholic Antiochian bishop of Homs, Hama, and Nebek in 1991. The frescoes in its chapel are priceless.

The community of Deir Mar Musa has an international cast of monks and nuns in their 30s plus some lay collaborators, including two married couples, and some novices, too.

After four years, those who are approved take perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, plus promises of contemplation, work, hospitality, and loving Islam. They wear gray woolen habits, cinched with a leather belt. They do not follow any special dietary restrictions but do not eat pork or drink wine when they have Muslim guests.

Shoeless, their heads covered with prayer shawls, the community kneels on fine Oriental carpets and shares an hour of prayer every morning, starting at 7:30, followed by a talk with Dall'Oglio. After breakfast, they work until 2:30 in the afternoon, milking their goats, making cheese, tending their gardens, and constructing a new building for the nuns and female guests. (They have already remodeled a series of ancient caves, north of the monastery, for the monks and male guests.) After lunch, they take a siesta when they can, they study, and they go on the Internet, creating a virtual monastery in cyberspace at www.deirmarmusa.org. In the evening at seven, they have an hour of silent prayer in their ancient chapel. Then they do their Eucharist.

Says Dall'Oglio, "We practice an Abrahamitic hospitality." In fact, hospitality is the whole point of their existence. They want to bridge the tremendous gap between the followers of Jesus and the followers of Mohammed, and they feel they can do this best by meeting with all who come—for a day or a week—answering their questions, inviting them to join in their prayers, building on their mountain a people's park with and for them, joining in their fasts for peace.

I don't agree with everything this priest has said; but the point is, there is a great example, and we need more like it. And I for one am convinced that it is the Foucauldian model of evangelization that can really bring peace to the Middle East, by first bringing forgiveness, reconciliation, and hospitality. I know this is ultimately not sufficient (or even proximately). Peace presupposes justice, and terrorist assaults on Israel do not create justice. That being said, peace also requires more than simply the absence of terrorist assaults and strong borders--in fact, we have no reason to hope that terrorist assaults will ever stop, without the hope of love.
"There is reason to hope...that by meeting and negotiating, men may come to discover better the bonds that unite them together, deriving from the human nature which they have in common; and that they may also come to discover that one of the most profound requirements of their common nature is this: that between them and their respective peoples it is not fear which should reign but love, a love which tends to express itself in a collaboration that is loyal, manifold in form and productive of many benefits."[Bl. John XXIII, Pacem in Terris]

Flee to the cities?

Critics of suburbia are often taken as proposing flight into the country and mass exodus from civilization into escapist compounds.

In fact, critics of suburbia usually argue first for the renewal of urban life--the flight to the cities. I have many friends who have made the conscious decision to move into the city, not away from it. They find that the city neighborhood offers unique advantages (over-against the suburbs) for a realization of community, for creating relationships of dependency with young, old, poor and marginalized, for a greater instantiation of their Catholic faith-lives. The traditional city is built toward a walking populace, which contributes to healthier living and again a greater realization of community. City parishes as well tend to be better instantiations of the People of God, both more challenging and more diverse, and very much more life-giving. These friends have found that living in the city/town has actually helped them better realize their life and mission as Christians, and better affect the New Evangelization in their family lives. I read Rod Dreher's chapter on "Home" as a strong validation of this insight.

Peter Maurin and Dorothy Day saw the building of urban centers ("houses of hospitality") and rural communities ("agronomic universities") as both irreducibly necessary for the renewal of culture. [N.B. I like to think we are contributing to the third point, "roundtable discussions," right here and now in the blogosphere!] Both depend on each other in many ways. The traditional towns of Europe (such as the one I lived in for two years in Austria: Gaming) are both densely urban and intimately dependent on local agriculture.

I was initially turned onto New Urbanism by James Howard Kunstler's Home From Nowhere. Rod Dreher has a bit of him in Crunchy Cons as well. It's a fantastic read, and for me, was one of those books that "changes the paradigm." Not so much the definitive theoretical work, as something that starts you thinking differently. Here is a constructive critique of Kunstler from a Christian perspective. Another great read is Sidewalks in the Kingdom: New Urbansim and the Christian Faith. They have a website as well: www.sidewalksinthekingdom.com. There is so much one can read on all this stuff--just look.

The point is: where we live is often just as important as how we live. Place embodies a whole nexus of cultural and symbolic import. Our houses, our neighborhoods, our towns, from aesthetics to businesses to transportation: these are very important factors in influencing how one authentically lives a culture of life, and particularly, how children our raised. In this sense, the village you have makes a world of difference in the children you raise. To say there are exceptions, that you know of some holy people in the suburbs, does not demonstrate that the suburbs themselves are not inimical to real flourishing. On the contrary, I think it is rather easy to show how suburbs in the structures, their symbolic import, the forms and relations they embody and entail, how they intend to, and often succeed in, creating a kind of life and community that in the end is contrary to a culture of life.

But the basic question is: how does the place I live influence, or make a difference, in how I live my life, in what I tend to desire, in what draws my attention, in the ways I tend to act, to relate to neighbors, in how my family and children relate to other families, in how I view other families and people as part of my own attainment of happiness, etc. Is it peripheral and accidental, arbitrary and for the most part a non-issue? In fact, I would argue that suburbia tends to create and reinforce the mindset and habit of placelessness. In the same way "place" is radically important for a deep participation in the Divine Liturgy (for helping us to worship in the reality of the New Jerusalem, the Cosmic Recapitulation), and a beautiful, symbolically rich church vs. a drab, beige, or at worst offensively Modernist church, aids or impedes Eucharistic worship. We are embodied spirits, and the buildings, artifacts, forms, structures we make do in fact make us into the people we become.

What difference does the place where I live make? I'd say, a whole culture of difference.

Apologetics and Belief (and more Percy)

The other day I had coffee with an old friend, from 1st grade amazingly enough, whom I have kept in touch with all these years, and whenever I am home, I try to hang out with. We went to the same Jesuit high school and had the same group of friends. He grew up Catholic, with a single mother, and was confirmed. After high school, he got into some trouble with substance abuse, but has recovered and has been sober for some time (which is even more remarkable considering the adversity he faces as Inuit). He has just finished his BA, and will be getting his MA in teaching shortly. In a lot of ways, a real success story.

However, like all of my friends from high school, he gradually fell away from the faith (or as the case may be, once he left home, without parental pressure, Mass fell out of the sphere of intentionality). I do not think he would call himself Christian any longer.

During our coffee, he asked me about where I'm at politically, and where my father as well is at. (My father is a religion teacher at the high school we attended.) I spoke at some length about how both of us feel homeless in the major political spectrum. Our political principles and practical conclusions are informed (hopefully) by our faith, by Catholic Social Teaching. This causes many pickles like, being for environmental protection and cautious towards big business, yet suspicious of socialist-like intrusions of the government into subsidiary areas of concern, particularly the family and the school. Etc.

From this, my friend explained how he thinks that religion itself is the problem, that religion only produces intolerance, and that religious influence on politics should be minimized. A sort of libertarian position, I took it. Rather than leave the discussion at politics, which I believe to be filled with all sorts of problems (qua discussion), I moved to the nature of religion.

What would be the argument, I asked, against the religious person? Let's say your next door neighbor is a Moslem, whom has certain absolute beliefs that leave him in a very definite place as to many political issues. And he cannot compromise or change these positions, because his reason is, that would be taking my faith to be now, untrue!

Because, at the least, one must understand the unique position the religious person inhabits. For the majority of people on the earth (of whom a libertarian or minimize-absolute-positions argument finds itself vis-a-vis this majority, increasingly the oppressor or unsympathetic antagonist, and not at all populist as it would like to see itself) are themselves of a traditional religious belief, which means, their beliefs (religion) are such that they make a total claim on reality, and furthermore, are founded by a kind of transcendent (and therefore, non-negotiable) authority. Those in the West, the educated elite who read the news and watch television produced to convince them of the normality of their positions, are the minority in the world as a whole. (Granted, the religious natures of Far-Eastern beliefs are more problematic, but generally the point stands).

Therefore, the interlocutor must recognize that the believer (as long as he remains true to the reasons for his belief--i.e. the authority upon which they stand) is in a unique position. Their beliefs of morality, for instance, are not the result of a moral calculus. True, they may also argue for the natural authority of such beliefs in the nature of man or a universal moral law, etc., but beyond the subjective force of conscience, it is the nature of that universal claim which that particular religion (whether Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu, etc.) makes that creates a universal force and applicability. Negotiation (that is the very quintessence of liberal politics) is most times imposible for the orthodox religious believer.

Of course it is important to distinguish traditional religious belief here with a kind of spiritualism or new-age sentimentalism or occultism or whatever. And the beliefs that advert to principles, versus conclusions that are practical applications (and may admit of contingency) of a universal principle.

Now, as St. Thomas recognized, the believer should be able to demonstrate how his beliefs are not irrational, that they do not contradict reason; in fact reason may be able to provide a kind of preamble to the faith. But reason cannot, by definition, ever prove religious belief. And so religious belief, by definition, is incapable of rational compromise.

The liberal (or post-modern if that is more exact) position that says, the problem is religious dogmatism, the absolute claims of religion; that many, if not most, political and societal conflicts come from the religious believers who will not compromise their beliefs, or rather, minimize the claim those beliefs make on reality--this position simply sees the majority of mankind and non-rationally tells them to give up their beliefs.

First, it must be noted that "belief" is natural to man, from opinion to trust to probability, and is not at all irrational, but healthy and very rational. (Irrational would be claiming absolute certainty where this is impossible, where a kind of belief should instead exist.)

I say non-rationally, because, it is not an argument to say, if we all got along, the world would be better off, and for us to all get along, we must find a way to agree politically; but agreements are usually impossible among people with firm convictions. Therefore, we must get rid of firm convictions.

Obviously, the argument itself is a kind of conviction or belief, not a proof. Furthermore, because faith is a peculiar kind of knowledge, it cannot be disproven, unless of course it makes irrational claims. But barring that, it is not really a kind of knowledge as we usually see it, but a message, news, a claim on reality.(See, Walker Percy, "The Message In The Bottle," and St. Thomas, ST II-II 1-9.) It is a claim that makes a difference as to what we know, but itself remains non-perspicacious. And yet it is seemingly absolutely certain.

There is no way to argue the Jew out of his beliefs. There is nothing irrational about his beliefs. And he believes, not because his beliefs are intelligibly open to him, but because God has spoken to the Jew and told him what is so, God has made a claim. The Jew who says, you know, for the sake of political expediency and cooperation, I will go along with policies that advocate marriage between two people of the same sex, is either a) simply an impious Jew; or b) a Jew who is no longer convinced (i.e. a secular Jew).

Because it is not intrinsically irrational that a divine message and claim could ever come at some time, the non-believer cannot on principle say that any believer is irrational and politically dangerous. (i.e. the accusation of "fundamentalism" is itself a fallacy) He cannot begrudge the believer's reasons, in so far as they are the reason of authoritative news. In fact, considering the weight of the news (personal salvation, eternal life, et al), he should probably attend to the message himself and discern its authority. If he thinks the news is dubious, false, untrustworthy, that could be an argument. But it would not be an argument against the absolute claims of religion as such, but only this particular claim.

Of course, as Walker Percy noted, in today's world, the news of Christianity is old hat. It's no longer news. And if someone is like Archimedes and doesn't even care if there is news or not, the news coming will make no difference. In other words, if someone does not realize he is sick and homeless and unhappy, he will not be on the lookout for the message in a bottle (the news of Christianity). So the first task is to make the man recognize his illness. You're sick, can't you see! And then recast Christianity as something novel and relevant.

That is the more detailed blog-version. But I think the conversation with my friend went well. I think I at least got him to think about the unique nature of religious belief (in the traditional, orthodox sense). It is not just crude superstition or pre-scientific weltanschauung.

But the problem remains: my friend is no longer a practicing (or even believing) Christian. So too, most of the people I've known from high school. Add many family members to boot. As to apologetics, I am not really convinced that the solution is a better argument. I think it is more about clearing the eyes, helping them to wake up out of the modern sleep and see how life really is; i.e. how they really need a savior. And then maybe connect the dots back to Catholicism. In a nutshell. But that, is a real real hard one.

Pressing thoughts from Walker Percy

I second the wonderful Flannery O’Connor references of late in several blogs. Another writer/thinker who explicitly based his own M.O. on O’Connor’s understanding was Walker Percy. Sentimentalism and vulgarity: two sides of the same coin. And it is the former, as O’Connor noted, that leads so many Christians astray. And as I never tire of repeating, as she said, sentimentalism leads to the gas chamber. The Christian novelist (and I would argue, a fortiori, the Christian evangelist) must shock his audience with a deliberate kind of rhetoric so as to put the truth in focus again—e.g. Tarwater baptizing and drowning the baby. Here is some of what Percy had to say:

The American Christian novelist faces a peculiar dilemma today. (I speak, of course, of a dilemma of the times and not of his own personal malaise, neuroses, failures, to which he is at least as subject as his good heathen colleagues, sometimes I think more so.) His dilemma is that though he professes a belief which he holds saves himself and the world and nourishes his art besides, it is also true that Christendom seems in some sense to have failed. Its vocabulary is worn out. The twin failure raises problems for a man who is a Christian and whose trade is with words. The old words of grace are worn smooth as poker chips and a certain devaluation has occurred, like a poker chip after it has been cashed in. Even if one talks only of Christendom, leaving the heathens out of it, of Christendom where everyone is a believer, it almost seems that when everybody believes in God, it is as if everybody started the game with one poker chip, which is the same as starting with none.

The Christian novelist nowadays is like a man who has found a treasure hidden in the attic of an old house, but he is writing for people who have moved out to the suburbs and who are bloody sick of the old house and everything in it.

The Christian novelist is like a starving Confederate soldier who finds a hundred-dollar bill on the streets of Atlanta, only to discover that everyone is a millionaire and the grocers won’t take the money.

The Christian novelist is like a man who goes to a wild lonely place to discover the truth within himself and there after much ordeal and suffering meets an apostle who has the authority to tell him a great piece of news and so tells him the news with authority. He, the novelist, believes the news and runs back to the city to tell his countrymen, only to discover that the news has already been broadcast, that this news is in fact the weariest canned spot announcement on radio-TV, more commonplace than the Exxon commercial, that in fact he might just as well be shouting Exxon! Exxon! for all anyone pays any attention to him.

The Christian novelist is like a man who finds a treasure buried in a field and sells all he has to but the field, only to discover that everyone else has the same treasure in his field and that in any case real estate values have gone so high that all field-owners have forgotten the treasure and plan to subdivide.[...]

What is the task of the Christian novelist who mirrors in himself the society he sees around him—who otherwise would not be a novelist—whose only difference from his countrymen is that he has the vocation to be a novelist? How does he set about writing, having cast his lot with a discredited Christendom and having inherited a defunct vocabulary?

He does the only thing he can do. Like Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus, he calls on every ounce of cunning, craft, and guile he can muster from the darker regions of his soul. The fictional use of violence, shock, comedy, insult, the bizarre, are the everyday tools of his trade. How could it be otherwise? How can one possibly write of baptism as an event of immense significance when baptism is already accepted but accepted by and large as a minor tribal rite somewhat secondary in importance to taking the kids to see Santa at the department store? Flannery O’Connor conveyed baptism through its exaggeration, in one novel as a violent death by drowning. In answer to a question about why she created such bizarre characters, she replied that for the near-blind you have to draw very large, simple caricatures.

[From: “A Novel About the End of the World,” in The Message In The Bottle]

AD MAIOREM DEI GLORIAM